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Abstract
For a coalitional game with transferble utility, the undominated core is a set of imputations
which are not dominated by any other imputations. This set is characterized by reduced game
property, individual rationality and a kind of monotonicity.
1 Introduction
In this note we treat solutions for coalitional games with transferable utility. The solutions are the core
and the undominated core which were considered in Gillies[3]. We characterize the undominated core,
that is, the set of all undominated imputations. The characterization is by axioms, one of which is the
reduced game property. In Tadenuma[10], the reduced game by Moulin[7] is used for characterizing
the core. We use a variation of the reduced game by Moulin[7]. Llerena/Rafels[6] characterizes the
undominated core by another reduced game. The results by Rafels/Tijs[9] and Chang[2] connects the
undominated core with the core, and these are effective in our study. For other earlier contributions
in this area, see the Reference of [6] and see [8]. For other contributions related to this area, see [1],[4]
and [5].
2 Definition of a game
Let  \mathbb{N} be the set of natural numbers and let it be the set of players. A cooperative game with
transferable utility (abbreviated as a game) is an ordered pair  (N, v) , where  N=\{1, , n\}\subset \mathbb{N} is a
finite set of  n players and  v , called the characteristic function, is a real‐valued function on the power
set of  N , satisfying  v(\emptyset)=0. A coalition is a subset of  N . We denote by  \Gamma the set of all games. For
a finite set  Z,  |Z| denotes the cardinality of  Z . For a coalition  S,  \mathbb{R}^{S} is the  |S| ‐dimensional product
space  \mathbb{R}^{|S|} with coordinates indexed by players in  S . The ith component of  x\in \mathbb{R}^{S} is denoted by  x_{i}.
For  S\subseteq N and  x\in \mathbb{R}^{N},  x_{S} means the restriction of  x to  S . We call  x\in \mathbb{R}^{N}a (payoff) vector. For
 S\subseteq N and  x\in \mathbb{R}^{N} , we define  x(S)= \sum_{i\in S}x_{i} (if   S\neq\emptyset ) and  =0 (if   S=\emptyset )  . A pre‐imputation for a
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game  (N, v)\in\Gamma is a vector  x\in \mathbb{R}^{N} that satisfies
 x(N)=v(N) . (1)
The set of all pre‐imputations for a game  (N, v)\in\Gamma is denoted by  X(N, v) . An imputation for a game
 (N, v)\in\Gamma is a vector  x\in X(N, v) that satisfies
 x_{i}\geq v(\{i\}) , \forall i\in N. (2)
 I(N, v) is the set of all imputations for a game  (N, v)\in\Gamma. A feasible vector for a game  (N, v)\in\Gamma is
a vector  x\in \mathbb{R}^{N} that satisfies
 x(N)\leq v(N) . (3)
The set of all feasible vectors for a game  (N, v) is denoted by  X^{*}(N, v) . Let  \sigma be a mapping that
associates with every game  (N, v)\in\Gamma' a set  \sigma(N, v)\subseteq X^{*}(N, v) where  \Gamma' is a subset of  \Gamma.  \sigma is called
a solution on  \Gamma'
Definition 2.1 A solution  \sigma on  \Gamma' satisfies the Pareto optimality (PO) if for every game  (N, v)\in\Gamma',
 \sigma(N, v)\subseteq X(N, v) .
Definition 2.2 A solution  \sigma on  \Gamma' satisfies the individual rationality (IR) if for every game  (N, v)\in\Gamma',
any  x\in\sigma(N, v),  x_{i}\geq v(\{i\}) for all  i\in N.
For a game  (N, v)\in\Gamma , define a game  (N, v^{-})by^{1}
 v^{-}(S)= \min\{v(S), v(N)-\sum_{i\in N\backslash S}v(\{i\})\}, \forall 
S\underline{\subset}N , (4)
Definition 2.3 A solution  \sigma on  \Gamma' satisfies the property  I (PR‐I) if for games  (N, v),  (N, w)\in\Gamma' such
that  v^{-}(S)\geq w^{-}(S) for all  S\subset N , and  v^{-}(N)=w^{-}(N),  \sigma(N, v)\subseteq\sigma(N, w) .
For a game  (N, v)\in\Gamma,  x\in X^{*}(N, v) and  S\subseteq N, a reduced game is a game  (S, v_{S}^{x})\in\Gamma . Here  S is the
player set and  v_{S}^{x} is the characteristic function which is defined by  v,  x and  S.
Definition 2.4 A solution  \sigma on  \Gamma' satisfies the reduced game property (RGP) if for a game  (N, v)\in\Gamma',
any  x\in\sigma(N, v) and any  S\subset N,  S\neq\emptyset,  (S, v_{S}^{x})\in\Gamma' and  x_{S}\in\sigma(S, v_{S}^{x}) .
Definition 2.5 A solution  \sigma on  \Gamma' satisfies the property II (PR‐II) if for a game  (N, v)\in\Gamma',  v(S)=
  \sum_{i\in S}v(\{i\}) for all  S\subseteq N , then  x\in\sigma(N, v) , where  x_{i}=v(\{i\}) for all  i\in N.
 1In[6] , this game is expressed as  (N, v') .
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3 Core for TU games
In this section the undominated core on  \Gamma is characterized by axioms where the reduced game is
defined as follows.
Definition 3.1 For  (N, v)\in\Gamma,  x\in \mathbb{R}^{N} and  S\underline{\subset}N , we define a reduced game  (S, v_{S}^{x})\in\Gamma by
 v_{S}^{x}(T)= \min\{v(T\cup(N\backslash S)), v(N)-\sum_{i\in S\backslash T}
v(\{i\})\}-x(N\backslash S)
(5) =v^{-}(T\cup(N\backslash S))-x(N\backslash S) , \forall T\subseteq S, 
T\neq\emptyset,
 v_{S}^{x}(\emptyset)=0.
Remark 3.2 This reduced game is a variation of the reduced game by Moulin [7]. The latter is used
for characterizing the core (See  [1\theta]).
Definition 3.3 For a game  (N, v)\in\Gamma and for  x,  y\in X(N, v),  x dominates  y via  S\subset N if
 x_{i}>y_{i}, \forall i\in S, (6)
 x(S)\leq v(S) .
Definition 3.4 The undominated core of a game  (N, v)\in\Gamma , denoted by  DC(N, v) , is defined by
 DC(N, v)= {  x\in I(N, v) :  x is not dominated by any  y\in I(N, v) }. (7)
The core of a game  (N, v)\in\Gamma , denoted by  C(N, v) , is defined by
 C(N, v)=\{x\in X(N, v) : x(S)\geq v(S), \forall S\subseteq N, S\neq\emptyset\} . (8)
The core and the undominated core were considered in Gillies [3]. The following is the main theorem
of this paper.
Theorem 3.5 The undominated core is the only solution on  \Gamma which satisfies RGP, IR, PR‐I, and
PR‐II.
To prove this theorem, we need 6 lemmas.
Lemma 3.6 The undominated core on  \Gamma satisfies RGP.
Proof: It suffices to see when the unmoderated core is nonempty. For  (N, v)\in\Gamma , suppose   DC(N, v)\neq
 \emptyset and let  x\in DC(N, v) . Hence  x\in I(N, v) . For  S\subset N,   S\neq\emptyset , consider  (S, v_{S}^{x}) . By definition,
 x(S)=v(N)-x(N\backslash S)=v_{S}^{x}(S) . (9)
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Claim 3.  6A.  x_{i}\geq v_{S}^{x}(\{i\}) for all  i\in S.
Proof of Claim 3.  6A : If  |S|=1 , that is,  S=\{i\} then  v_{\{\}}^{x_{\dot{i}}}(\{i\})=x_{i} because  x\in I(N, v) . Let
 |S|\geq 2 . Assume  x_{i}<v_{S}^{x}(\{i\}) for  i\in S . Then
 x(N\backslash S)+x_{i}<x(N\backslash S)+v_{S}^{x}(\{i\})
 =v^{-}(\{i\}\cup(N\backslash S))
 = \min\{v(\{i\}\cup(N\backslash S)), v(N)-\sum_{j\in S\backslash \{i\}}v(\{j\})
\} (10)
  \leq v(N)-\sum_{j\in S\backslash \{i\}}v(\{j\}) .
From this,
 x(N \backslash S)+x_{i}+\sum_{j\in S\backslash \{i\}}v(\{j\})<v(N)=x(N) . (11)
That is,
  \sum_{j\in S\backslash \{i\}}v(\{j\})<x(S\backslash \{i\}) . (12)
This implies that there exists  j^{*}\in S\backslash \{i\} such that
 x_{j^{*}}>v(\{j^{*}\}) . (13)
Define  z\in \mathbb{R}^{N} by
 z_{j}=\{\begin{array}{ll}
x_{j}+\varepsilon,   if j\in\{i\}\cup(N\backslash S) ;
x_{j}*-\delta,   if j=j^{*};
x_{j},   otherwise,
\end{array} (14)
where  \delta and  \varepsilon are determined so that
 0< \delta=\varepsilon|\{i\}\cup(N\backslash S)|<\min\{x_{j}*-v(\{j^{*}\}), v^{-
}(\{i\}\cup(N\backslash S))-x(\{i\}\cup(N\backslash S))\} . (15)
Then  z\in I(N, v) and  z dominates  x via  \{i\}\cup(N\backslash S) in  (N, v) . This contradicts  x\in DC(N, v) . This
completes the proof of Claim 3.  6A.  \square 
From Claim 3.  6A and (9), we see  (S, v_{S}^{x})\in\Gamma_{I} and  x_{S}\in I(S, v_{S}^{x}) . We shall show  x_{S}\in DC(S, v_{S}^{x}) .
Assume that  y\in I(S, v_{S}^{x}) dominates  x_{S} via  T\subset S in  (S, v_{S}^{x}) . That is,
 y(S)=v_{S}^{x}(S)=x(S) ,
 y_{\dot{i}}\geq v_{S}^{x}(\{i\})=v^{-}(\{i\}\cup(N\backslash S))-x(N\backslash 
S), \forall i\in S, (16)
 y_{i}>x_{i}, \forall i\in T,
 y(T)\leq v_{S}^{x}(T)=v^{-}(T\cup(N\backslash S))-x(N\backslash S) .
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We let  Q\equiv\{i\in S\backslash T:x_{i}>v(\{i\})\} and  P\equiv\{i\in S\backslash T:x_{i}=v(\{i\})\} . By (16),
 x(T)+x(N\backslash S)<y(T)+x(N\backslash S)
  \leq v^{-}(T\cup(N\backslash S))\equiv\min\{v(T\cup(N\backslash S)), v(N)-
\sum_{i\in S\backslash T}v(\{i\})\} (17)
  \leq v(N)-\sum_{i\in S\backslash T}v(\{i\}) .
This implies
  \sum_{i\in S\backslash T}v(\{i\})<v(N)-x(T)-x(N\backslash S)=x(S\backslash T) . (18)
Hence there exists  i\in S\backslash T such that  x_{i}>v(\{i\}) . That is,   Q\neq\emptyset . Define  z\in \mathbb{R}^{N} as follows.
 z_{i}=\{\begin{array}{ll}
x_{i}+\varepsilon_{i},   if i\in N\backslash S;
y_{\dot{i}}-\delta_{\dot{i}},   if i\in T;
v(\{i\}) ,   if i\in P;
x_{i}-\eta_{\dot{i}},   if i\in Q,
\end{array} (19)
where
 0<\delta_{i}<y_{i}-x_{i}, \forall i\in T,
 \varepsilon_{i}>0, \forall i\in N\backslash S,
 0<\eta_{i}\leq x_{i}-v(\{i\}), \forall i\in Q (20)
 y(T)-x(T)-\delta(T)+\varepsilon(N\backslash S)=\eta(Q) ,
 \varepsilon(N\backslash S)\leq\delta(T) .
Indeed, we can find  \delta_{i},  \varepsilon_{i} and  \eta_{\dot{i}} which satisfy (20) as follows. Since  x(Q)- \sum_{i\in Q}v(\{i\})>0 , choose
 k\geq 2 so that
 0< \frac{y(T)-x(T)}{k}\leq x(Q)-\sum_{\dot{i}\in Q}v(\{i\}) . (21)
Second, choose  \eta_{\dot{i}}>0,  \forall i\in Q so that
  \eta(Q)=\frac{y(T)-x(T)}{k}>0 and  \eta_{i}\leq x_{i}-v(\{i\}),  \forall i\in Q . (22)
Choose  \delta_{i}>0,  i\in T so that  y_{i}-x_{i}- \delta_{i}<\frac{\eta(Q)}{|T|} for all  i\in T . This implies  y(T)-x(T)-\delta(T)<\eta(Q) .
Finally, determine  \varepsilon_{i}>0,  i\in N\backslash S so that the equality in (20) is satisfied. Then
  \varepsilon(N\backslash S)-\delta(T)=\eta(Q)-[y(T)-x(T)]= (\frac{1}{k}-1)[y(T)
-x(T)]\leq 0 . (23)
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So (20) is feasible with respect to  \delta_{i},  \varepsilon_{i} and  \eta_{i} . From (19) and (20)
 z(N)=x(N \backslash S)+\varepsilon(N\backslash S)+y(T)-\delta(T)+\sum_{i\in P}v
(\{i\})+x(Q)-\eta(Q)
 =x(N)=v(N) .
 z(T\cup(N\backslash S))=y(T)+x(N\backslash S)-\delta(T)+\varepsilon(N\backslash
S)
 \leq v_{S}^{x}(T)+x(N\backslash S)-\delta(T)+\varepsilon(N\backslash S) (24)
 = \min\{v(T\cup(N\backslash S)), v(N)-\sum_{i\in S\backslash T}v(\{i\})\}-
\delta(T)+\varepsilon(N\backslash S)
  \leq\min\{v(T\cup(N\backslash S)), v(N)-\sum_{i\in S\backslash T}v(\{i\})\}
 \leq v(T\cup(N\backslash S)) .
From (19) and (20), we see  z_{i}\geq v(\{i\}) for all  i\in N . From this and (24),  z\in I(N, v) . Consequently,
 z dominates  x via  T\cup(N\backslash S) in  (N, v) , which contradicts  x\in DC(N, v) . This completes the proof
of Lemma 3.6.  \square 
Lemma 3.7 The undominated core on  \Gamma satisfies IR, PO ,PR‐I and PR‐II.
Proof: By definition, the undominated core satisfies IR and PO. It is known  (Rafels/Tijs(1997))
that for any game  (N, v) such that  I(N, v)\neq\emptyset,  DC(N, v)=C(N, v^{-}) . By the definition of the
core,  C(N, v^{-})\subseteq C(N, w^{-}) for any  (N, v),  (N, w) such that  v^{-}(S)\geq w^{-}(S) for all  S\subset N , and
 v^{-}(N)=w^{-}(N) . Since   I(N, v)\neq\emptyset , we have   I(N, w)\neq\emptyset , which implies  DC(N, w)=C(Nw^{-}) .
Hence  DC(N, v)\subseteq DC(N, w) and the unmoderated core satisfies PR‐I. It satisfies PR‐II since any
imputation can not dominate itself.  \square 
Lemma 3.8 If a  \mathcal{S}olution  \sigma on  \Gamma satisfies RGP and IR, then it satisfies PO.
Proof: For  (N, v)\in\Gamma , let  x\in\sigma(N, v) . By RGP and IR,
 x_{i} \geq v_{\{\dot{i}\}}^{x}(\{i\})=\min\{v(\{i\}\cup(N\backslash \{i\})), 
v(N)-\sum_{j\in\{i\}\backslash \{i\}}v(\{j\})\}-x(N\backslash \{i\}) (25)
 =v(N)-x(N\backslash \{i\}) .
From this,  x(N)\underline{>}v(N) . Since  \sigma(N, v)\underline{\subset}X^{*}(N, v),  x(N)\underline{<}v(N) . Hence we have  x(N)=v(N) .  \square 
Lemma 3.9 If a solution  \sigma on  \Gamma \mathcal{S}atisfies RGP, IR, PR‐I and PR‐II, then  DC(N, v)\subseteq\sigma(N, v) for
all  (N, v)\in\Gamma.
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Proof: Suppose that a solution  \sigma satisfies RGP, IR and PR‐I. For  (N, v)\in\Gamma , if   DC(N, v)=\emptyset
, then it trivially holds. Suppose   DC(N, v)\neq\emptyset . So   I(N, v)\neq\emptyset . Let  x\in DC(N, v)\subseteq I(N, v) .
Since  DC(N, v)=C(N, v^{-}),  x\in C(N, v^{-}) . Hence,  x(S)\geq v^{-}(S) for all  S\subseteq N . Define a game
 (N, v_{x})\in\Gamma by  v_{x}(S)=x(S) for all  S\subseteq N . Since  x(S)=v_{x}(S) for all  S\subseteq N and  (v_{x})^{-}=v_{x} , we
have  (v_{x})^{-}(S)\geq v^{-}(S) for all  S\subseteq N and  (v_{x})^{-}(N)=v^{-}(N)=v(N) . By PR‐I,  \sigma(N, v_{x})\subseteq\sigma(N, v) .
By the assumption and by Lemma 3.8,  \sigma satisfies IR and PO. That is,  \sigma(N, v_{x})\underline{\subset}I(N, v_{x}) . By PR‐II,
 x\in\sigma(N, v_{x}) . Hence,  x\in\sigma(N, v) .  \square 
Lemma 3.10 Suppose that  \sigma on  \Gamma satisfies RGP and IR. If  v(S)=v^{-}(S) for all  S\subseteq N then
 \sigma(N, v)\subseteq C(N, v) .
Proof: Let  x\in\sigma(N, v) . By RGP,  x_{S}\in\sigma(S, v_{S}^{x} ) for all  S\subseteq N . By IR,  x_{i}\geq v_{S}^{x}(\{i\}) for all  i\in S.
Since  v(S)=v^{-}(S) for all  S\subseteq N , we have  v(S) \leq v(N)-\sum_{j\in N\backslash S}v(\{j\}) for all  S\subseteq N . This implies
 v_{S}^{x}(\{i\})=v(\{i\}\cup(N\backslash S))-x(N\backslash S) for all  i\in S . Hence,  x(N\backslash S)+x_{i}\geq v(\{i\}\cup(N\backslash S)) for all
 i\in S . This implies  x(T)\geq v(T) for all  T\subseteq N since
 \{\{i\}\cup(N\backslash S) : i\in S, S\subseteq N\}=\{T\subseteq N\} . (26)
Hence we have  x\in C(N, v) .  \square 
Lemma 3.11 If a solution  \sigma on  \Gamma satisfies RGP, IR and PR‐I, then  \sigma(N, v)\subseteq DC(N, v) for all
 (N, v)\in\Gamma.
Proof: Assume   I(N, v)\neq\emptyset . Since  (v^{-})^{-}(S)=v^{-}(S) for all  S\subseteq N , by PR‐I and Lemma 3.10 we
have  \sigma(N, v)=\sigma(N, v^{-}) and  \sigma(N, v^{-})\subseteq C(N, v^{-}) . Then  C(N, v^{-})=DC(N, v) . Hence  \sigma(N, v)\subseteq
 DC(N, v) . Next assume   I(N, v)=\emptyset . By Lemma 3.8 and IR,  \sigma(N, v)\subseteq I(N, v)=\emptyset . Hence  \sigma(N, v)=
 \emptyset\subset DC(N, v) .  \square 
From Lemmas 3.6 and 3.7, the undominated core satisfies all properties in the statement of the
theorem. From Lemma 3.9 and 3.11, a solution on  \Gamma must coincide with the undominated core if it
satisfies all properties in the statement of the theorem. This completes the proof of the theorem.  \square 
The next examples show that the properties in Theorem 3.5 are independent.
Example 3.12 Let  \sigma^{1}(N, v)=I(N, v) for all  (N, v)\in\Gamma . By definition,  \sigma^{1}\mathcal{S}atisfies IR, PR‐I and
PR‐II. Let  N=\{1,2,3\} and  v(N)=3,  v(13)=v(23)=2,  v(12)=1 and  v(i)=0 for  i=1,2,3 . Then
 x=(1,2,0)\in I(N, v) . Let  S=\{1,2\} . We see  x_{\{1,2\}}\not\in I(\{1,2\}, v_{\{1,2\}}^{x})=\sigma^{2}(\{1,2\}, v_{\{1,2\}}^
{x}) because
 v_{\{1,2\}}^{x}(\{1\})=2>x_{1}=1 . Hence it does not satisfy RGP.
Example 3.13 Let  \sigma^{2}(N, v)=\emptyset for all  (N, v)\in\Gamma . Then  \sigma^{2} satisfies IR,PR‐I and RGP. But it does
not satisfy PR‐II.
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Example 3.14 Let  \sigma^{3}(N, v)=C(N, v) for all  (N, v)\in\Gamma . By  definition_{f}\sigma^{3}\mathcal{S}atisfie\mathcal{S} IR and PR‐
II. Let’s see it satisfies RGP. Let  x\in C(N, v) . Then by definition,  v_{S}^{x}(S)=x(S) for all  S\subseteq N.
 x(T)=x((N\backslash S)\cup T)-x(N\backslash S)\underline{>}v((N\backslash S)
\cup T)-x(N\backslash S)\geq v_{S}^{x}(T) for all  T\subseteq S . Hence
 x_{S}\in C(N, v_{S}^{x}) . Next, let’s see it does not satisfy PR‐I. For  N=\{1,2,3\} , let  v(i)=w(i)=0 for
 i=1,2,3 and  v(N)=w(N)=5 . Let  v(12)=w(12)=2 and  v(13)=w(13)=3 . Let  v(23)=5 and
 w(23)=6 . Then  C(N, v)=\{(0,2,3)\} and   C(N, w)=\emptyset , while  v^{-}(S)=w^{-}(S) for all  S\underline{\subset}N.
Example 3.15 Let  \sigma^{4}(N, v)=\{x\in X^{*}(N, v) : x_{i}\leq v(N)-v^{-}(N\backslash \{i\}), 
\forall i\in N\} for all  (N, v)\in\Gamma.
For  \mathcal{S}ufficiently large  \varepsilon>0,  y_{\dot{i}}\equiv v(N)-v^{-}(N\backslash \{i\})-\varepsilon<v(\{i\}) for some  i\in N as well as
 y(N)\leq v(N) , but  y\in\sigma^{4}(N, v) . So  \sigma^{4}(N, v) does not  sati_{\mathcal{S}fy} IR. Suppose  v^{-}(S)\geq w^{-}(S) for all
 S\subseteq N and  v^{-}(N)\geq w^{-}(N) . Then  v(N)=w(N) and  v(N)-v^{-}(N\backslash \{i\})\leq w(N)-w^{-}(N\backslash \{i\}) for all
 i\in N . This implies  \sigma^{4}(N, v)\subseteq\sigma^{4}(N, w) . Hence  \sigma^{4} satisfies PR‐I. Next suppose  v(S)= \sum_{i\in S}v(\{i\})
for all  S\subseteq N . Then  \sigma^{4}(N, v)=\{x\in X^{*}(N, v) : x_{i}\leq v(\{i\}), \forall i\in N\} , which implies  x\in\sigma^{4}(N, v)
where  x_{i}=v(\{i\}) for all  i\in N . Hence  \sigma^{4} satisfies PR‐II. Next suppose  x\in\sigma^{4}(N, v) . Let  S\subseteq N.
Since  x(N)\leq v(N) , it holds  x(S)\leq v(N)-x(N\backslash S)=v_{S}^{x}(S) .
 v_{S}^{x}(S)-(v_{S}^{x})^{-}(S \backslash \{i\})=v_{S}^{x}(S)-\min\{v_{S}^{x}(S
\backslash \{i\}), v_{S}^{x}(S)-v_{S}^{x}(\{i\})\} (27)
 = \max\{v_{S}^{x}(S)-v_{S}^{x}(S\backslash \{i\}), v_{S}^{x}(\{i\})\}
Here
 v_{S}^{x}(S)-v_{S}^{x}(S \backslash \{i\})=v(N)-\min\{v((S\backslash \{i\})\cup
(N\backslash S)), v(N)-v(\{i\})\} (28)
 = \max\{v(N)-v((S\backslash \{i\})\cup(N\backslash S)), v(\{i\})\}
So
 v_{S}^{x}(S)-(v_{S}^{x})^{-}(S \backslash \{i\})=\max\{v(N)-v(N\backslash \{i\}
), v(\{i\}), v_{S}^{x}(\{i\})\}
 )  \max\{v(N)-v(N\backslash \{i\}), v(\{i\})\} (29)
 =v(N)-v^{-}(N\backslash \{i\})
Hence  x_{S}\in\sigma^{4}(S, v_{S}^{x}) . So  \sigma^{4} satisfies RGP.
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